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Abstract
Responsible governance is as much to do with how organizations engage their
human capital as it is to do with the relationship between the owners/agents of
capital. In pluralistic organization forms, the assumption that board directors, through
traditional hierarchy, can ensure appropriate degrees of control over the managers of
capital seems increasingly problematic. An imposition of control that fails to take
account of diverse employees interests is of questionable ethical rigour, and certainly
unlikely to be effective in encouraging responsible corporate behaviour. Building
responsible, moral organizational communities must therefore be concerned with
reconfiguring hierarchy in a way that builds the voluntary commitment of employees
to super-ordinate goals. Borrowed from political philosophy, this paper develops the
idea of voluntarism as an organising principle that can further the development of
corporate responsibility by mediating between the demands for corporate control and
efficiency and the need to respond to calls for greater inclusion.
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Responsible governance is as much to do with how organizations engage their
human capital, as it is to do with the relationship between the owners and agents of
capital (Child, 2005, Child and Rodrigues, 2003). In today’s highly plural organization,
- where stakeholders hold a diversity of conceptions about organizational purpose,
organising and intended outcomes (Huzzard and Ӧstergren, 2002), - the assumption
that the board of directors, through traditional hierarchy, can ensure appropriate
degrees of control over the managers of capital seems increasingly problematic
(Child, 2005). A one sided imposition of control that fails to take account of diverse
employees interests is at least of questionable ethical rigour, and certainly unlikely to
be effective in encouraging responsible corporate behaviour (Rousseau and Rivero,
2003, Crane et al, 2004). Building responsible, moral organizational communities is
thus intimately concerned with reconfiguring hierarchy in a way that builds the
voluntary commitment of employees to super-ordinate goals (Courpasson and Dany,
2003).
In the context of contemporary hyper-competitive business environments, this issue
is considered critical to effective organization (Child, 2005). In these conditions,
organizational success may be as much the product of continual innovation as it is of
efficiency (Child and McGrath, 2002). Such innovation is recognised as being
inextricably intertwined with organizational knowledge networks (Ashmos et al, 2000)
and the willingness of employees to share their social and intellectual capital freely
(Stewart, 1997). Greater employee participation provides organizations with the
opportunity to self organize, innovate and co-evolve in more effective ways (Ashmos
et al, 2002). In such pluralist settings, “harnessing the capabilities and commitment of
knowledge workers is, it might be argued, the central managerial challenge of our
time. Unfortunately it is a challenge that has not been met” (Manville and Ober,
2003:48). Despite, several decades of attempts to reconfigure the role of
organizational hierarchy by empowering workers and enabling them to participate in
organization decision making, little progress has been made (Heller, 1998) and
employees remain essentially disenfranchised (Manville and Ober, 2003).
For at the same time as organizations strive to build the commitment of their
employees, they are engaged in a second objective tugging in the opposite direction;
one of standardizing procedures, integrating systems and creating consistent
corporate cultures (Adler, 1999). The rational bureaucratic model of organising,
implicit in this objective runs deep in managerial mindsets; how can business leaders
improve on such a well-developed concept of how human beings collectively best
accomplish their objectives (Child and McGrath, 2001)? Despite their best intentions
to empower employees, most are still working from a perspective that values unity
and control over plurality (Brunson, 2002). Thus attempts to liberalise the workplace
through strategies of empowerment and culture management have only tended to
reinforce a hierarchical approach to organization, one that values conformity, a
priority toward economic and technical values, power focussed at the corporate
centre and top down decision making (Willmott, 1993, Cludts, 1999).
In recent years, there have been a variety of academic discourses that have sought
in different ways to address the issues of coherence and plurality. These have
included the development of stakeholder theory (Clarkson, 1995, Donaldson, 1999)
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Mackenzie, 1997), Community of Practice (COP) theory (Lave and Wenger, 1991,
Brown and Duguid, 1991, 2001) and the nascent coevolutionary and complex
systems movements (Lewin and Volberda, 1999, Galunic and Eisenhardt, 2001).
Often coming from different epistemological traditions, each makes a helpful
contribution to the debate. However, we argue in this paper that, despite offering rich
insights into the issue, none provide, nor in some cases are intended to provide,
senior managers with clear and practical methods of re conceptualising the role of
bureaucracy in organization.
We therefore suggest that there is a significant lacuna in the literature as to how
executives can best capitalise on plurality whilst still retaining levels of organizational
coherence. This paper will contribute to this debate by developing the concept of
organizational voluntarism as a potential contribution to re configuring the role of
hierarchy in pluralist organizational forms. The COP conceptualisation of
organizations as communities of communities, mirrors a similar discourse in the
political philosophy literature about the role and value of voluntarism as a
constituency of mature societies (Etzioni, 1999, Putnam, 2000, Verba et al, 1995).
From a communitarian perspective, in the ‘good’ society the moral voice that
determines the nature of good citizenship is the product of a diversity of voluntary
associations or communities. These groups serve to mediate between the private
world of individuals and the large institutions of society. However, most importantly, a
good society is determined by such voluntary associations implicitly inculcating a
level of self-control in its members by introducing them to particular values that
reinforce individuals’ normative commitments to that society. We propose that in an
organizational setting, voluntarism can provide a means of harnessing plurality whilst
still encouraging voluntary levels of coherence because identification with the
organization or its constituent parts are cultivated within a framework free from senior
management control.
The analysis of the above literature suggests that this issue is inherently concerned
with how institutional schema are influenced by, and exert influence on individual
action. The investigation of voluntarism in organizations therefore lends itself to a
perspective in which action and structure are linked through social relationships
(Giddens, 1984, Hales, 1999, Blaikie, 1993). From this standpoint, we will explore
how institutional schemata both constrain and encourage the values of voluntarism
and demonstrate why voluntarism may emerge as a natural stage in the evolution of
organizations. We explore in greater detail the nature of the disjuncture in the
practical and theoretical discourses about the evolving nature of organizations and
provide a clear rationale for the adoption of organizational voluntarism as an
organising principle in pluralist settings.
Our intention here is to promote the concept of organizational voluntarism, and in
doing so, hope to stimulate feedback and debate as to its efficacy in furthering the
discourse on corporate responsibility. At a time of growing unease about the role of
organisations in society and the attendant consequences for corporate governance
and social responsibility, the issue of who determines the ‘moral voice’ in
organisations is significant (Courpasson and Dany, 2003). In this context, voluntary
association may serve to mediate between individuals and their work organisation in
a way that enables employees to contribute to this debate.
4Theories of organising that reflect increasing plurality
There has been much consideration of how the broader shifts in the nature of social
institutions are impacting organizational forms (Sparrow and Cooper 1998, Cohen
1999). Gratton and Ghoshal (2003) describe this ‘revolution’ in terms of a desire for
individuals to express their potential, the need for protection from the arbitrary use of
power, and involvement in people determining the conditions of their association
(2003:1). These types of change are consequently seen to be transforming individual
relationships with institutions at both social and organizational levels, but at their core
reflect the primacy of individuals and their capacity to act with autonomy (Gratton and
Ghoshal, 2003, Patten, 2001).
At the same time as demands for more participative organization forms increase, the
competitive business environment forces these organizations to be more efficient and
responsive, in turn creating loosely coupled and structurally diverse forms with varied
and competing interests (Butcher and Clarke, 2002). In such pluralistic settings
‘leadership roles are shared, objectives divergent and power diffuse’ (Denis et al,
2001:809) and sustainable competitive advantage is seen to lie in “micro assets that
are hard to discern and awkward to trade” (Johnson et al, 2003:4). These assets are
most likely to lie at the edges of organizations in the hands of line managers, such
that more people, more often, need to be involved in strategy than ever before (ibid).
For an increasing number of commentators this shift in power toward employees
substantially changes the role and function of organization hierarchy to a degree that
executives cannot ignore (Handy, 1997, Gratton, 2004). Managing these power shifts
and plurality of interests therefore reflects a natural evolution in organization form. If
this transition is inevitable, then what are the markers of organization form that will
facilitate this change in practice? The significance of this question has stimulated rich
research and debate about future organizational forms.
In this regard, considerable attention has been given to the conceptual development
of stakeholder theory as one approach to resolving these dilemmas (Kochan and
Rubinstein, 2000). In stakeholder theory, a firm’s survival is seen as being dependent
upon its ability to create sufficient wealth, value or satisfaction for all its interested
parties, including employees (Clarkson, 1995, Donaldson, 1999, Jones, 1999,
Friedman and Miles 2002, Phillips et al, 2003). At its most fundamental, stakeholder
theory questions the primary purpose of corporations as the pursuit of shareholder
return. This unitary approach to ownership is increasingly seen as unsustainable in a
society where multiple stakeholders, in effect, ‘invest’ in the corporation. Authors
such as Etzioni (1998) claim that all such interests should have the opportunity to
participate in organizational governance. Aside of high profile debate as a theory of
social renewal (Giddens, 1998), stakeholder theorists, however, as John Hendry
points out, “have either restricted themselves to very modest claims as to the respect
to be afforded to stakeholders within the existing legal and institutional structure, or,
more commonly, pitched their claims so high as to sacrifice any practical credibility”
(2001:223). Others argue that a more in depth appreciation of the power and identity
of different types of stakeholder (including employees) and how they change over
time is required (Friedman and Miles, 2002, Jawahar and McLauglin, 2001, Rowley
and Moldoveanu, 2003).
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how best to resolve the problems of a normative (ethical) response to a plurality of
interests, or an instrumental (economic performance) response to stakeholder theory
(Donaldson 1999). Yet this dialogue has for the most part, we believe, been
conducted in the arcane language of academia and had little practical impact on
thinking of senior management (Halal, 2000). In this regard, Hendry (2001), Rowley
and Moldoveanu (2003), and to an extent Donaldson (1999), suggest that more
progress might be made if stakeholder theory gives greater weight to the idea of the
organization as a complex system of social relationships, an area of ‘huge
importance’ in understanding emerging organization forms (Child and McGrath,
2001). In this way, the ethical and economic conflicts of stakeholder theory can be
understood as being resolved in the same way as the moral conflicts of individual
managers facing the practical dilemmas of everyday life.
Another approach to the problem has been to encourage the development of
Organization Citizenship Behaviours (Organ, 1988, Podaskoff and Mackenzie, 1997,
Bolino, 1999, Ryan, 2001, Wat and Shaffer, 2005). These are described as individual
behaviours that are discretionary, not directly or explicitly recognised by formal
reward systems and that in aggregate promote the effective functioning of an
organization (Organ, 1988). This concept therefore implicitly acknowledges the value
of individual contributions. However, despite many years of theoretical development,
critics contend that the refinement of OCB as a concept has been constrained by the
reliability and validity of the measurement systems employed (Van Dyne at al, 1995,
Allen et al 2000) and is merely “old wine in new bottles” and indistinguishable from
constructs such as commitment and altruism that have been subject to more rigorous
research (Latham et al, 1997). “OCB is currently in danger of degenerating into a
contentless construct to the extent it defines everything and anything and hence
cannot advance our understanding of employee behaviour” (ibid:207).
Nor is there any great clarity as to the motives for employees to adopt OCB without
which operationalising the concept at work remains difficult. Differences of opinion
seem to exist as to the importance of context (Karambayya, 1990, Turnipseed and
Murkison, 2000), protestant work ethic, (Ryan, 2002), moral reasoning (Ryan 2001)
and impression management (Bolino, 1999). Most importantly, Graham (2000) draws
attention to the inherently unitary conception of the central OCB tenet of ‘civic virtue’.
In most of the OCB literature, this construct reflects purely affiliative and conformist
(Speier and Frese, 1997) behaviour. In doing, so it avoids discussion about the
legitimacy of existing power distributions and negates the value of challenge and
political action central to the traditional conception of citizenship and thus for citizens
to change the social order in which they are located.
A further avenue of research is to be found in the development of communities of
practice theory (COP) (Lave and Wenger, 1991, Brown and Duguid, 1991, 2001).
From a COP perspective, the plurality of organizational life is reflected in the
conception of organizations as dynamic communities of communities (Brown and
Duguid, 1991). In these communities learning, innovation and its dissemination take
place in both formal and informal groups. The COP literature sheds light on how
knowledge and innovation is freely shared or restricted by structure and potentially
provides insight into how senior managers might address some of the tensions of
coherence and plurality in hierarchy.
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trend in the COP literature to emphasise the idea of communities as a managed
rather than spontaneous process, one that gives preference to a discourse that omits
the role of organizational power and politics. Again, this observation reinforces the
problem facing senior management, how can they encourage informal groups without
recourse to diktat yet still create levels of organization coherence? Some light is shed
on the issue by Swan et al (2002) in their study of networked innovation within the
health care sector. The authors note how a group of senior managers were able to
address this issue by “sublimating their business motivations in the cause of
community building” (2002: 494). However, COP theory is essentially concerned with
the relationship between work, learning and innovation (Brown and Duguid, 1991,
2001) not explicitly with the reconfiguration of hierarchy.
Two other complimentary fields of study, which address several of the shortfalls
discussed above, have been the nascent complex systems and co evolutionary
movements (Lewin and Volberda, 1999). Both take as their point of departure the
idea that organization change and evolution are a reflection of multi level and multi
directional causalities in both inter and intra firm interdependencies and thus play
close attention to the plurality of interests at play in organizations. Taken from these
perspectives, organizations are viewed as complex adaptive systems that are
continually self organizing and co evolving (Colbert, 2004). In particular, in contrast to
some of the research agenda discussed above, research into the micro-processes of
evolution emphasise the influence of social connectivity (Ashmos et al 2002) in
mediating plurality and coherence.
For example, research by Schilling and Steensma (2001) suggests that firms that
experience complexity in terms of “high levels of demand and input heterogeneity”
(ibid 2001:1161) place great value on modular organization forms. That is, firms need
internal structural divergence in order to work with growing variations in strategic
opportunities and industry sub environments (Malnight, 2001). The structural fluidity
reflected by these modular forms emphasises the importance of social capital and
diverse relationships as a significant process for mobilising coherent activity rather
than merely hierarchical position (Denis et al, 2001, Butcher and Clarke, 2002).
Indeed, research by Ashmos et al (2002) suggests that increasing participation in
decision making increases this social connectivity which in turn gives the
organization the opportunity to self-organise and co evolve in more effective ways. In
this way, levels of coherence are produced from a plurality of interests.
Nevertheless, considerable questions remain unanswered about mediating
coherence and plurality. For example, whilst some insight into the effect of
institutionalised power relationships is provided by Pettigrew (1995) and Child and
McGrath (2001), this issue warrants further attention. For example, Ashmos et al
(2002) provide little information as to exactly what form participation should take; in
what way is it constrained or enabled by hierarchy? In a similar vein, Levinthal and
Warglien (1999) note, with some irony, that while ideas of self-organization have
captured enormous attention, practitioners and academics have been left with a
puzzle, how are such self-organizing systems to be controlled and directed?
Furthermore, what might be the motivation of individual managers to work in this
way? Brown and Eisenhardt (1997), in highlighting the role of ‘semi structures’ in
complex environments that help create a balance between chaos and inertia, focus
on the motives of autonomy, choice and an opportunity for improvisation. However,
there is no rigorous framework that seeks to map out the cognitions of managers
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organizations develop enough coherence among their parts to allow deliberate
strategic change remains unanswered” (2001:809).
The disjuncture between organizational theory and practice
The size of this lacuna is further magnified by a substantial disjuncture between the
theory and practice of organization design. Despite increasing employee participation
noted by commentators such as Gratton and Ghoshal (2003) and Cloke and
Goldsmith (2002), Thompson and Davidson (1995) suggest that this alleged
‘progress’ bears little resemblance to the reality of organizational life. Despite the
pressure on executives to reconsider the conventions of organizational structure,
these emerging operating principles remain in their infancy because they appear at
odds with the dominant bureaucratic logic of organizing (Child and McGrath, 2001).
This logic has been described as a ‘rational mindset’ (Butcher and Atkinson 2001) or
‘rational myth’ (Czarniawska, 2003). This type of mental model or schema is
developed through experience of the wider institutions of organizational and social
life and acts as a deep influence on action (Giddens, 1984). In this rational mindset
priority is given to the enactment of a hierarchy that reflects technical and economic
values, power focussed at the corporate centre, top down decision making and
organizational structures and systems that encourage unitary working (Butcher and
Atkinson, 2001, Brunson, 2002).
Such is the influence of this mindset, that attempts to empower employees and to
create less authoritarian organization cultures only tend to reinforce levels of
normative control and unitary approaches to managing (Cludts, 1999, Willmott, 1993,
Robertson and Swan, 2003). This has the effect of creating a gap between the
rhetoric of employee participation and the reality of organizational control (Legge,
1995). In turn, this encourages cynicism (Dean et al, 1998) and a calculative
approach to participation (Cludts, 1999). The pre eminence of this schema also has
the effect of diminishing the legitimacy of alternative models of organising and thus
the opportunity for radically reframing the role of participation and its role in hierarchy
remains under-explored by senior managers (Cludts, 1999). Therefore, not only is
there a substantial lacuna in organization theory as to how executives should seek to
reconceptualise the role of bureaucracy (Adler, 1999), but this gap is exacerbated by
a managerial mindset that actively ‘rationalises’ attempts to address the issue.
Based on this review, we argue that any new theory of hierarchy and participation
must be comprehensive enough to make good the shortfalls identified in the existing
discourses we have discussed. We believe that there are at least four different
criteria that any such new theory in this area must adequately reflect. Firstly,
axiomatic to the debate, is the need to reflect the increasing trend toward plural
organization settings (Denis et al, 2001) in which the need to respond to individual
autonomy and independence, particularly amongst critical knowledge workers and
managers is central to organization success. Secondly, any new theory must be able
to surface the influences of dense and interrelated social relationships and
community norms on participatory behaviour. Managers negotiate these relationships
both as part of what they do and to establish what they should do (Hales, 1999) and
this process is therefore critical in understanding how systemic structural
characteristics (Giddens, 1984) both influence and are influenced by an alternative
conceptualisation of hierarchy. Thirdly, against this backdrop of partisan interest, new
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different approach to hierarchy and participation. What are the interpretative
schemas that managers use to make meaningful actions that apparently challenge
existing conventions of management? Finally, in order for such an approach to gain
legitimacy with senior managers working with a rational mindset, any new theory
must be able to make strong linkages to improved organization performance.
The extent to which each of the four perspectives discussed here reflect these
criteria is summarised in figure 1. However, in brief, whilst each approach provides a
useful contribution to the issue of coherence and plurality, there is no one approach
that satisfactorily accounts for all four. Stakeholder theory has given insufficient focus
to the requirements of employees – and other stakeholders – (Friedman and Miles,
2002), and OCB has neglected the issue of power and politics in the
conceptualisation of citizenship (Graham, 2000). This has also largely been an
omission in COP theory (Fox, 2000), albeit that more recent treatments are seeking
to redress this position. The Complexity and Co evolutionary theories reflect well the
issues of social connectivity but provide insufficient insight into the motivations of
individual actors to work with or encourage greater levels of participation and how
these cognitions are influenced by dominant power relationships. Nor do any of these
approaches (nor are they really intended to) really provide senior leaders with clear
and practical principles about reconfiguring the role of hierarchy – especially without
resorting to unitary and rational values that implicitly undermine the value of the
plurality they seek to establish.
Take in figure 1 about here
Having established the extent of the lacuna in this issue and the priorities that new
theory must reflect, we turn our attention to an alternative approach – organizational
voluntarism.
Organizational Voluntarism
In attempting to address this central organizational issue we have found in the arena
of political philosophy a parallel debate that we consider to be instructive. In the
political discourse surrounding the basis for a ‘good’ democratic society, the same
polarised tension between coherence and plurality can be identified. Should society
rely on the state to shape good citizens, as social conservatives would have it, or
should good citizens be the product of a liberal moral pluralism? Writers such as
Etzioni (1993, 1995, and 1999), Box (1998), and Putnam (2000) promote a third,
communitarian approach to tackling this issue that has many parallels for the debate
about the role of organizational hierarchy. From a communitarian perspective, in the
good society the moral voice that determines the nature of good citizenship is the
product of a diversity of voluntary associations. These associations range from
membership of local community action groups to membership of political parties and
serve to mediate between the private world of individuals and the large institutions of
society. The opportunity to selectively participate in associations, free from state
influence, is fundamental to the creation and preservation of liberty. However, most
importantly, a good society is determined by such voluntary associations implicitly
inculcating a level of self-control in its members by introducing them to particular
values that reinforce individuals’ normative commitments to that society. It is the
opportunity to choose the psychological communities to which one is committed and
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as possible, that is the hallmark of a mature democratic society.
Whilst we acknowledge that organizations do not mirror society exactly, there are
increasing similarities between the two contexts to justify the value of a theory of
social participation in an organization setting. In both an organizational and political
institutional setting the issue is the same, how best to encourage collective
commitment toward super ordinate goals without recourse to sanctions (Brightman
and Moran, 1999). In both settings, power is increasingly distributed across different
institutions and interest groups (Etzioni, 1998) and there is continual competition
between groups for support of worthy causes (Denis et al 2001, McPherson and
Rotolo, 1996, Rowley and Moldoveanu, 2003). In this context, organizational
leadership, like its political institutional counterpart, is implicitly concerned with how to
coalesce support for action whilst valuing difference and conflict (Peters and
Williams, 2002).
We therefore believe that voluntarism has the potential for illuminating organization
theory and offers two particular benefits. Firstly, at a time of increasing concern over
the role of organizations in society, and the attendant consequences for corporate
governance and social responsibility (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2001) the issue of
who determines the moral voice in organizations is of growing interest (Courpasson
and Dany, 2003). As democratic systems of governance protect the right to voluntary
association, so organizational hierarchy may serve to legitimise this same principle
(Coopey and Burgoyne, 2000, Courpasson and Dany, 2003). In doing so, such
voluntary association may serve to mediate between individuals and their work
organization in a way that enables participation in the establishment of organization
values and which builds commitment to the establishment of moral communities
(d’Iribarne 2003, Courpasson and Dany 2003). Secondly, the application of
voluntarism in a pluralistic organization setting may provide an alternative conception
of hierarchy in so much that voluntarism encourages a level of self-organization that
can facilitate organizational coherence irrespective of managerial diktat. This self-
organization is increasingly viewed as critical for encouraging the necessary levels of
innovation and continual reconfiguration of strategic capabilities necessary for
sustained competitive advantage. (Child and MacGrath, 2001, Rindova and Kotha,
2001).
At this time, when set against the dominance of the rational mindset and the
illegitimacy of alternative approaches, voluntaristic behaviour in organizations can be
best understood as an expression of individual agency. Its wider adoption as a
managerial approach will depend upon its legitimisation as a useful organising
principle. It is important to note however, that we see hierarchy and plurality as
always being in tension; they are at one level dialectically opposed, and at another,
both essential aspects of organizing (Brunson, 2002). As in mature societies, once
levels of democracy have been attained, the focus for political discourse is one of
expressing preferences about its enactment. We do not suggest therefore that
voluntarism will resolve this tension in plurality and coherence, but instead that it
provides a ‘relational synthesis’ (Clegg, 2003:378) of both, in which progress toward
more responsible organization forms may be made by going beyond the notion that
more of one necessitates less of the other.
In this context we define organizational voluntarism as a stage of organizational
evolution/a marker of pluralistic organizational form in which managers recognise the
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need to engage in debate and action to pursue matters of individual and organization
concern irrespective of hierarchical position or explicit authority. This definition is
premised on the idea that unofficially constituted groups in organizational settings are
able to provide the level of self-control necessary for the maintenance of
organizational congruence; a multiplicity of stakeholder agendas does not
necessarily create organizational incoherence (Rowley and Moldoveanu, 2003,
Thietart and Forgues, 1997). Further, that these groups are more likely to do so when
they can express voice and contest views about which organization values are
important to them (Cludts, 1999, Rousseau and Shperling, 2003) without the
intervention of formal authority. As with voluntary associations, such organizational
arrangements would bring people together to pursue interests through collective
action, serve to distribute power, and mediate between individuals and the
organization, thereby creating a sense of involvement (Cabrera and Cabrera, 2002).
It is in the nature of voluntarism that some groups may be focussed on issues of
critical organization concern, others may be more parochial in outlook. Crucially
however, they would collectively and voluntarily facilitate the flow of information
between different groups (Brown and Duguid, 1991) and the organizational
connectivity required to stimulate innovation (Ashmos et al, 2002).
The concepts of voluntarism and communitarianism are not without their detractors.
For example, communitarianism has often been seen as taking insufficient account of
institutionalised power relationships (Reynolds, 2000, Giddens, 1984). Critical
theorists have been keen to highlight the dark side of communities that tend to imply
or assume coherence and consensus (Contu and Willmott, 2003, Reynolds, 2000).
Thus, it is important to stress here that the conception of voluntarism discussed in
this paper is very much concerned with the “politics of difference” (Reynolds,
2000:71) where conflicts and differences are accepted as being inevitable and not
always resolvable. This orientation is similar to the notion of an ‘arena’ described by
Burgoyne and Jackson, (1997) in the context of management learning in which
“differences ‘meet’, are fought over and reconciled and reconfigured into new
groupings, factions and alliances” (1997:61). In this way, voluntarism is the synthesis
of a ‘managed’ and a non coercive process of participation.
The difference between one system of governance and another is the capacity that
individuals have to both deliberate and make decisions (March and Olsen, 1995).
Organizational voluntarism redefines hierarchy as a process to encourage voluntary
groups and individuals to deliberate and decide upon their own identity minimising,
regulation through institutional control. This may still take the form of praise, reward
or support, but avoiding coercion towards unitary priorities, in order that these groups
themselves in turn influence the establishment of organizational core values.
Extending the parallel with democratic governance, the role of hierarchy would also
be to mediate between deserving causes, challenging constituents to justify the
significance of their agendas and their demands for resource. The role of top
management would remain to provide fundamental organizational framing, but that
this would take into consideration many voices, and by satisfactorily justifying their
conclusions and actions to their constituents.
In this context, organizational leadership comes to reflect a collective phenomena
(Barker, 1997) in which the representation of different organization constituencies, by
a wide range of individuals assumes a greater significance. In practice, this means
that politics, as with its counterpart in a political institutional setting, is a necessary
and logical process by which diverse interests and stakeholders are reconciled
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(Butcher and Clarke, 2002, Held, 1987). Indeed, as with the political institutional
model, significant interest groups serve to check the power invested in formal
hierarchy. Therefore, far from politics being an irrational organizational response
(Stone, 1997), such activity becomes a judicious way of managing inevitable
differences. The legitimate pursuit of individual and often competing agendas also
provides greater opportunities for individuals to negotiate self and work identities and
thus their identification with wider organizational priorities. This voluntary process is
best achieved by leadership behaviours that encourage self-organization (Daboub,
2002), valuing difference and conflict (Ashcraft, 2001), the protection of weaker
groups (Galunic and Eisenhardt, 2001) and helping groups to create their own values
and ethics (Cludts, 1999).
This ‘representative leadership’ is essential to ensure that participation does not
become ‘enforced’ and thus merely provide a more sophisticated from of control
(Robertson and Swan, 2003). This form of participation is predicated on leaders
acknowledging their responsibility to act as stewards of constructive political activity,
without which individuals have no legitimate process of positioning causes and
reconciling differences. The legitimate use of politics is dependent upon leaders
being able to demonstrate the ethical content of their decisions by their ability to
balance personal and organizational interests (Butcher and Clarke, 2001) in the
pursuit of causes that are worthy, from a social, as well as economic point of view
(Galunic and Eisenhardt, 2001). As such, senior managers will be actively embracing
the role of community architect in which the need for civic virtue (Starrat, 2001), the
ability to balance individual interests with those of the social and economic interests
of the wider organizational community, becomes central to leadership.
Organization voluntarism as an emerging theory of organization form
At this stage, this view of organization form represents an exploratory contribution to
theory (Boisot and Child, 1999), but one that reflects emerging organization practice
in existing pluralist organization settings. For example, Denis et al, (2001), in their
study of leadership and strategic change in the pluralistic setting of hospital
administration, note, in line with our observations of voluntarism, how leadership is
necessarily a collective process. In a situation where power is diffuse and objectives
divergent, levels of coherence are achieved by constellations of leaders who are
sensitive to the needs of different constituencies in order to gain credibility and
support. Constructive political activity, in terms of compromise, lobbying, alliances
and collaborative solutions are central to how support is mobilised. In particular,
Denis et al note the role of “creative individuals and committed unified groups in
proactively moving to make change happen” (2001:834) in situations where the
legitimacy of change initiatives cannot be taken for granted. The same conclusions
are reached by Clarke and Meldrum (1999) in their study of bottom up change and
Lipman-Blumen and Leavitt’s (1999) exploration of ‘hot groups’ reflects similar
aspects of unofficial behaviour.
Evidence of the way in which such communities can stimulate change and innovation
is provided by Swan et al (2002) who demonstrate how radical innovation in the
health care sector was achieved against a backdrop of diverse professional interests
and uneven power relations. Coherence in approach was achieved through a
discursive strategy, reflective of Reynolds “politics of difference” (2000:71), that
sought to align the competing interests and agendas in the innovation process
through the rhetoric of community and engagement with the diverse interests that
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constituted that community. Also, the management team were able to balance
commercial interests with the broader values of other groups by sublimating purely
economic considerations in the cause of community building. Research by Ashmos
et al (2002) suggests that this type of engagement helps to generate multiple
perspectives of the environment, In turn, this alters an organization’s predisposition
to new challenges and opportunities, thus stimulating innovation and continual
adaptation. Similar conclusions are reached by Ravasi and Verona (2001) and Foss
(2003) in their analysis of the Danish company Oticon. In Oticon, innovation is
sustained by highly devolved structures and bottom up project proposals, and
strategic coherence the product of negotiation amongst a plurality of internal markets,
coordinating groups and roles.
However, notwithstanding these examples, central to our argument here is the need
to stimulate broader debate and theory building about the reconfiguration of
organizational plurality and coherence. So, to what extent might the concept of
voluntarism make good the shortfalls in existing theory building by meeting the four
criteria we identified; - the centrality of organizational plurality, the embeddedness of
social relations and power in organizational working, accounting for the motivations
of managers to pursue actions in contravention of traditional approaches, and the
need for clear organizational benefits? Firstly, at a time when plurality of organization
form is only likely to increase (Denis et al, 2001), the concept of voluntarism clearly
assumes the inevitability and value of plurality, greater autonomy and choice as
being central to organization success. Diversity of interest and autonomy of individual
action are prerequisites for voluntarism. Reflecting as they do, broader changes in
society, ultimately, these factors may well be the most significant drivers for the
adoption of voluntaristic principles. In this way, we view voluntarism as a natural
stage in the evolution of organization form.
Secondly, borrowed from communitarian philosophy, voluntarism directly reflects the
centrality of social relationships, community and power in the structuration of action
and thus provides a basis for understanding how institutional power distributions both
influence and are influenced by the enactment of these voluntaristic principles. The
centrality of power reflected in the dualism of hierarchy and participation, competition
and collaboration, local autonomy and strategic coherence, embody the structuration
of resources, cognitive and moral rules upon which managers draw that both
constrains and enables what they do (Hales, 1999, Giddens, 1984). With
organizational voluntarism, power and its negotiation through political discourse is
positioned as an explicit leadership activity; “power is the means of getting things
done” (Giddens, 1984:283). For example, Denis et al (2001) highlight how leaders in
pluralistic settings mobilise a range of symbolic and material resources to create
influence and “strategic couplings” which include; aligning with widely held
perceptions about organizational issues and environmental constraints, the use of
positional authority, secrecy, leveraging the credibility of acknowledged performance,
maintaining appropriateness of behaviour in the eyes of significant support groups
etc. Through such practices, over time, managers are able to constitute and
reconstitute what they do and who they are as contextual forces evolve (Denis et al,
2001).
However, as the authors highlight, their study does not deal with micro level variables
of individual motivation. Of particular significance to the concept of voluntarism is the
question as to why individuals might wish to engage with ideas that, at least in the
short term, are at odds with the dominant rational approach to organising. What are
13
the interpretive schemata (Hales, 1999, Giddens, 1984) that managers draw upon to
make their work meaningful in pluralistic settings? For the authors, this question is
the subject of ongoing research but initial theorising suggests that a model of
voluntaristic behaviour can be informed by the discourse on identity and work
meanings (Alvesson and Willmott, 2002, Wrzesniewski and Dutton, 2001, Robertson
and Swan, 2003, Knights and McCabe, 2003).
From this perspective all managers are continuously engaged in forming and
repairing a sense of self-identity that is coherent and distinctive (Alvesson and
Willmott, 2002). Self-identity is thus a complex mixture of conscious and
subconscious elements, an interpretative and reflexive grid of schemas shaped by
experience of endless interactions with individuals and societal institutions (Alvesson
and Willmott, 2002, Giddens, 1984). We argue that the idea of voluntarism as we
have described it here reflects a bundle of such schemas or cognitions about
organizational working that enable some managers to create and sustain viable
definitions of who they are and what they do, often in contravention of
institutionalised arrangements, but that still enhance affirmation of self (Hales 1999,
Wrzesniewski and Dutton, 2001, Weeks and Galunic, 2003). At this stage, we
propose that voluntaristic leadership behaviour is influenced by four cognitions about
the nature of organising and managing; (1) the degree to which organizations are
conceptualised as places of either plural or unitary interests, (2) the degree to which
‘managing’ concerns the pursuit of individual and or organizational goals, (3) the
extent to which this influences perceptions of managerial discretion versus
perceptions of managerial responsibility and (4) the extent to which political debate is
considered an appropriate mechanism for managing competing interests. These
briefly are amplified below.
Firstly, we argue that voluntaristic behaviour is influenced by the extent to which
individuals perceive organizations as unitary or pluralistic in form. Organizational
voluntarism reflects the notion that in order for managers to deviate from the
bureaucratic model they must be able to appreciate the genuine legitimacy of a wider
range of interests than those determined by a unitary mindset. In turn, this suggests
that differences and their resolution must be seen as a central and valuable aspect of
organizational working rather than an aberration or an additional factor to be
considered in the mix of management behaviour (Nahapiet et al, 2005).
The second cognition reflects the idea that if organizations are seen to reflect a
plurality of interests, it follows from this those individuals will also view autonomy and
personal interest as being legitimate. However, as in a political institutional setting,
such a predisposition can only be predicated the basis that this individuality is
balanced with a collective sense of morality (Barker, 1997, Knights and McCabe,
2003). This ‘civic virtue’ (Starrat, 2001) reflects an understanding “that the very
source of [this] individuality is in effect social not individual” (Knights and McCabe,
(2003:1594). In this way, ‘representative’ leaders recognise that the pursuit of their
own interests is inextricably interwoven with the successful achievement of others
goals.
The third cognition concerns perceptions about organization discretion and
autonomy. This is a function of whether managers perceive responsibility – the
common denominator of all managerial work (Hales, 1999) – to be given or taken. In
other words do managers perceive themselves bound by the responsibility for
achieving assigned outcomes or free to pursue matters of individual or group agency
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as well (Hales 1999, Kakabadse and Kakabadse 2005)? Perceptions of discretion
are also a function of senior management support and the extent to which such
individuals are able to redefine the rules and resources that constrain voluntaristic
managerial action (Hales, 1999).
The fourth cognition concerns the legitimacy of politic debate. Managerial work is
implicitly concerned with the positioning of causes and is thus inherently political
(Buchanan and Badham, 1999, Butcher and Clarke, 2001). As in a political
institutional context this may include covert as well as publicly sanctioned activity and
can only be viewed as legitimate if employed in the pursuit of organizationally
worthwhile outcomes. However, such outcomes may be interpreted in different ways.
Thus, political behaviour can only be construed as legitimate if leaders are able
demonstrate the ethical content of their decisions by their ability to balance personal
and organizational interests (Patten, 2001, Butcher and Clarke, 2001) in the pursuit
of causes that are worthy, from a social, as well as economic point of view (Galunic
and Eisenhardt, 2002). This is similar to Buchanan’s (1999) notion of a ‘logic of
political action’ in which individuals justify their behaviour by reference to the
maintenance of their reputations, being able to account for their actions and being
able to identify positive organizational outcomes. In this regard, cognitions of
personal interest, predicated on civic virtue, are distinct from perceptions of self
interested political behaviour.
It is our proposition that these four cognitions act reflexively on each other, and in
turn, influence the degree to which individual managers may pursue voluntaristic
behaviour. In the absence of legitimate alternative models of working with plurality,
this cognitive framework enables managers to interpret their circumstances and thus
their identities, in very individual (pluralist) ways. In enacting these schemas,
managers are able to establish levels of micro emancipation (Alvesson and Willmott,
1996, 2002) because they enable individuals to resolve or at least, work with, rather
than “close off” some of the chronic structural uncertainties of management (Hales
1999). That is, a voluntaristic mindset promotes a plurality of discourses about the
nature of organising and thus extends the opportunities for identity formation
(Alvesson and Willmott, 2002). It is also our premise that even though, over time,
voluntarism may gain greater legitimacy in the eyes of senior management, these
schemas will remain of significance because coherence and plurality, hierarchy and
participation and so on will always remain in tension. To varying degrees, managers
will always struggle against the unequal distribution of power implicit in the
bureaucratic model.
The fourth criterion by which new theory must be judged is that of providing strong
linkages to improved organization performance, for without which, there is little
incentive for senior management to adopt such principles. In this regard, we see the
idea of voluntarism fitting well within the co evolutionary discourse in which the need
for organizational flexibility and the continual reconfiguration of strategic capabilities
is viewed as critical to sustainable competitive advantage in dynamic environments
(Galunic and Eisenhardt, 2001, Rindova and Kotha, 2001). The concept of
voluntarism and its themes of local autonomy and diversity, reflect emerging views as
to the importance of self-organization in allowing for a dynamic feedback between
itself and its environment in order to co evolve (Lewin and Volberda, 1999, Ashmos
et al, 2002). The self-organization inherent within the voluntaristic form clearly
facilitates the process of rapid reconfiguration to respond to different market
circumstances (Galunic and Eisenhardt, 2001, Child and McGrath, 2001, Eisenhardt
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and Martin 2000). Perhaps, most acutely for senior managers, the concept of
voluntarism also provides a framework for capitalising on diversity in the pursuit of
innovation. Local communities, being at the interface of the organization and its
environment are seen to be a rich source of innovation (Brown and Duguid, 1991,
2001). Research by Ashmos et al (2002) and Ravasi and Verona (2001) highlight
how participation helps to generate multiple perspectives that in turn alters an
organizations predisposition to new challenges and opportunities and thus potentially
stimulates innovation. In effect, these ideas reflect further schemas about the
structural characteristics of institutions that will serve to legitimate voluntarism in the
eyes of senior management.
However, above all else, we believe that the concept of voluntarism provides senior
managers with a model for merging hierarchical structure with greater egalitarian
practice (Ashcraft, 2001). Whilst cooperation declines as organization size increases,
voluntary group discussion in value setting leads to increased commitment (Cludts,
1999) and contribution (Cabrera and Cabrera, 2002). Such communication also
enhances group identity and personal responsibility, which are powerful mechanisms
of self control (Cabrera and Cabrera, 2002, Cludts, 1999). Indeed, paradoxically,
managers are seen to enhance their authority by participating in this debate (Cludts,
1999). By acknowledging the tension between, for example, the seemingly
paradoxical relationships of hierarchy and participation, or local autonomy and
strategic coherence, the resulting ‘organized dissonance’; - the “strategic union of
forms presumed to be hostile” - can produce critical levels of organizational
resonance (Ashcraft, 2001:1304). Indeed, voluntarism may come to be considered as
one of the ‘few simple but often contradictory rules’ (Galunic and Eisenhardt, 2001)
that are believed to guide the development of successful co-evolution.
Conclusion
At a time when society is questioning the nature of governance, and corporate
executives searching for more responsible ways to harness the commitment of
employees, the concept of voluntarism provides an organising principle that may help
to synthesise the contradictory demands for strategic coherence and organizational
plurality. In so doing, it also offers a framework in which work organizations might
fulfil a broader role in mediating the needs of individuals and society at large.
Our aim here has been to layout the basic tenets of voluntarism in order to invite
further research and debate. At this stage, when set against the dominance of the
rational mindset, voluntarism is most likely to be seen as legitimate in contexts that
require high levels of self-organization and where “the unceasing bubbling of
communities allows the organization to innovate constantly” (Cohendet et al,
2004:39). However, on the assumption that society and organising will continue to
reflect an increasing plurality of interests (Denis et al, 2001) we envisage that the
emancipatory possibilities and operational flexibility offered by voluntarism will
become evermore attractive to senior managers and employees alike.
The asymmetric distribution of power evident in most organization settings suggests
that voluntarism will not emerge bottom up. Kochan and Rubinstein (2000) and
Patten (2001) note that the influence of powerful leaders is critical to the
establishment of more democratic forms of governing. Leaders wishing to encourage
the wider adoption of such principles are thus faced with a dilemma; how to ensure
that voluntarism, like that of COP, does not come to reflect a more sophisticated
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process of social control? To avoid this trap, organization leaders will need to be
genuinely interested in representing the motivations and interests of those they lead.
Based on our analysis here we offer the following proposition;
That managers who pursue ‘representative leadership’ behaviours will be
influenced by cognitions of organization working that reflect (1) plurality of
interests, (2) the value of personal interest and (3) the need to ‘take’
responsibility and (4) the value of political models in the reconciliation of
competing interests.
That is, perceptions about organizational pluralism (1) drive perceptions of the value
of individual interest (2) and the need to exercise discretion (3). These cognitions in
turn encourage a positive approach to a political model of behaviour (4). Each of
these informs and reinforces the others in a reflexive manner.
This proposition now forms the basis for a research agenda that will focus on the
lived experience of individual managers, and can be seen as a response to calls for
more research on the micro activities of what managers do and why they do it
(Johnson et al, 2003). In particular, it will attempt to illuminate the relationship
between identity formation and micro emancipation (Alvesson and Willmott, 2002) by
investigating some of the “material, moral and cognitive grounds of managing”
(Hales, 1999).
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